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Book Review
Mark V. Tushnet, Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle Over Guns. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 176, $19.95.
Reviewed by Dennis A. Henigan
Rarely does an author go to the trouble of writing a book about a subject 
in which he has little interest. Yet that apparently is what Harvard Law School 
Professor Mark Tushnet did in Out of Range: Why the Constitution Can’t End the Battle 
Over Guns. He acknowledges as much in the Introduction: “Before writing this 
book, I had only an academic interest in the Second Amendment—and I still 
do; neither the Second Amendment nor gun policy generally ranks high on 
my list of concerns” (xv). Tushnet writes not only as a disinterested observer, 
but as a largely uninterested observer.
This unusual vantage point has much to do with the tone and content of this 
book. The author writes as a thoughtful, dispassionate onlooker, encountering 
the arguments on both sides of the gun issue for the first time. There is much 
that is rewarding about following Professor Tushnet as he winds his way 
through the arguments, displaying his considerable descriptive and analytic 
skills. In short, much of Out of Range is truly enjoyable reading.
It is not surprising that Tushnet regards neither the Second Amendment 
nor gun policy as high on his list of personal concerns, since the core theme 
of the book is that the gun debate is not over legal or policy issues that have 
importance in themselves, but rather is a debate about something else entirely—
as he puts it, “about how we understand ourselves as Americans” (xix). In his 
view, the gun issue is yet another battle in the perpetual “culture wars,” in 
which great heat is generated on both sides about legal and policy questions 
that turn out to be of little significance. According to Tushnet, interest groups 
function to fan the cultural flames on both sides of the issue in order to bring 
in donations, but neither policy proposals to expand gun ownership and 
carrying, nor those to further regulate it, are likely to make any difference to 
the level of gun crime and violence (76).
There is no question that there are important cultural dimensions to the 
gun issue. For many Americans, the gun has enormous symbolic significance 
as the wellspring of individual liberty and the guarantor of a free society. And, 
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for many on the gun control side, it is difficult to understand how guns can be 
seen as anything other than instruments of death and destruction.
But, as I develop more fully below, it is surely possible to acknowledge the 
cultural dimensions of the gun issue without reaching the conclusion that there 
is nothing more at stake. For example, Tushnet concludes that “gun policies 
of any sort probably have relatively little effect on the level of gun violence, 
not to mention violent crime” (130). This claim is largely unsupported in his 
text and, in fact, is contradicted by a wealth of empirical evidence that remains 
unmentioned in the book. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions giving 
a broad reading to the Second Amendment (issued after the publication of the 
book) may well have the paradoxical effect of lessening the cultural intensity 
of the gun debate, allowing a greater focus on the practical benefits of gun 
regulation for public safety.
Tushnet’s theme—that the gun debate is “much ado about nothing,” 
except the culture wars—is the central flaw in Out of Range. Having begun his 
examination of the gun issue from a largely “uninterested” perspective, Out of 
Range essentially functions as an elaborate justification of that perspective. The 
“uninterested observer” point of view gives the book one of its strengths—its 
radical dispassionateness—but turns out also to be the source of its greatest 
weakness in its failure to make any serious effort to understand the public 
health and safety importance of gun regulation.
Perhaps this is an appropriate point for me to recognize that, given my own 
record as a gun control advocate, it should come as no surprise that I would 
have a problem with a text suggesting that stronger gun laws would have no 
impact on crime or violence. Indeed, I have worked for over twenty years for 
one of the groups—the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence—that Tushnet 
sees as a big part of the problem, because such groups (he also includes the 
National Rifle Association here) simply stir up the cultural war on guns, 
distracting attention from other policies not involving gun regulation that 
could have a real impact in making us safer.
To this I would respond that disinterested, or even uninterested, observers 
can be wrong, while passionately committed advocates can be right. It should 
be the quality of the arguments and evidence that ultimately matters, not the 
mindset of the advocate. Tushnet’s “uninterested” approach has not cornered 
the market on insight. Indeed, it deprives Out of Range of the depth required for 
a more satisfying illumination of a very complex issue.
The Second Amendment Debate
Most of the book is devoted to the clash of arguments over the meaning 
of the Second Amendment: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”1 Of course, much has happened on that front since 
Out of Range was published in 2007. A year later, the Supreme Court issued its 
1. U.S. Const. amend. II.
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landmark ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller,2 a 5–4 decision striking down 
the District of Columbia’s handgun ban and holding, for the first time in 
our history, that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to possess a gun 
in the home for self-defense, with no necessity of a connection between gun 
possession and a “well regulated Militia.” Since the District of Columbia is 
a federal enclave, Heller established this right only as to the District and the 
federal government, reserving the question whether the Second Amendment 
right, as newly defined, applies as a restraint on states and localities through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In June 2010, the Supreme Court, in McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, answered this question in the affirmative, by the same 5–4 vote 
that had decided Heller.4 The McDonald Court struck down Chicago’s handgun 
ban as a violation of the Second Amendment.
Tushnet’s treatment is very much a “first impression” of the Second 
Amendment debate. In his words, he has “described the main lines of 
argument,” but “can’t pretend that my discussion here deals with every nuance 
of the arguments made by proponents of gun rights and those of gun control” 
(25). Of course, Tushnet is free to provide a “once over lightly” account. It also 
is legitimate to inquire whether his first impression may be misleading, once 
the inquiry goes a bit deeper.
Tushnet finds the opposing arguments about the Second Amendment “in 
reasonably close balance.” If a strictly originalist approach is used—that is, if an 
“understanding of its terms when it was adopted” were the only issue—Tushnet 
finds that the pro-gun-rights position “is a bit stronger than the alternative” 
(xvi). However, he finds an exclusively originalist approach defective as a 
general interpretive principle. If original meaning is used merely as a starting 
point and other interpretive tools, such as precedent, are taken into account, 
Tushnet finds that “[g]un control proponents have a significantly stronger case 
than their adversaries…” (xvi).
The role of originalism in the debate is an interesting subtext of Tushnet’s 
discussion. Given his conclusion that supporters of gun control have a much 
better case if originalism is given a minor part in the debate, he is puzzled 
about “why gun-control proponents think they should fight” on “textual 
and originalist grounds” (68). He must be equally puzzled as to why Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Heller devotes so much attention to the original meaning 
2. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
3. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n.23.
4. McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08–1521 (U.S. Sup. Ct. decided June 28, 2010). It should 
be noted, however, that there was no majority for a common theory explaining how the 
Second Amendment applies to states and localities. Four justices, in a plurality opinion by 
Justice Alito, determined that the Second Amendment applies through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not through that Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 44 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). In his 
concurrence, Justice Thomas adopted the Privileges or Immunities theory, but rejected the 
Due Process theory. Id. at 1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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issue (although it also addresses precedent and other considerations as well), 
and why Justice Breyer, in his dissent in McDonald, continues the attack on 
Heller’s analysis of original meaning.5
My own view is that the fight on “textual and originalist grounds” is 
unavoidably important to understanding the Second Amendment because 
the text itself is so foreign to contemporary ears. How are we to even begin to 
understand what a “well regulated Militia” is without trying to discern what 
the phrase meant in 1791? What is it to “keep and bear Arms”? To contemporary 
courts, the Second Amendment must appear as if written in a foreign language. 
This is not to say that original meaning is the only relevant interpretive tool, 
but it is certainly easy to understand why it has assumed such a dominant role 
in the Second Amendment debate.
The fact that the text seems so opaque to modern readers does not 
necessarily mean that its original meaning is, as Tushnet seems to think, a close 
question. The text may need translation, but its meaning is not necessarily 
destined to be unclear once the proper techniques of translation are used. A 
careful analysis of the historical record makes a strong case that the subject 
matter of the Second Amendment is entirely the distribution of military power 
between state militias and a federal standing army, and has nothing to do with 
the right to have a gun for personal purposes.
In this conclusion, I have good company. Justice Stevens’s powerful 
dissent in Heller plainly did not find it to be a close question, concluding 
that the majority opinion “has utterly failed” to establish a non-militia, 
personal right “as a matter of text or history.”6 It also is revealing that the 
originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment as guaranteeing a right 
to be armed for personal, non-militia purposes receives virtually no support 
among professional historians. Of the sixteen academic historians who joined 
briefs amicus curiae in Heller, fifteen argued for the militia purpose view.7 The 
historians’ attack on the personal purpose reading has continued in earnest 
5. McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 2–5 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. Heller, 129 S.Ct. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. The historical case supporting the view that the original meaning of the Second Amendment 
concerned the bearing of arms in an organized militia was persuasively presented in a brief 
filed in Heller by fifteen academic historians. See Brief of Jack N. Rakove et al., as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (No. 07–290). Only one professional 
historian, Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm of George Mason University Law School, filed a 
brief in Heller supporting the contrary view as a matter of original meaning. Brief of the 
CATO Institute and History Professor Joyce Lee Malcolm as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (No. 07–290). Long before Heller, historians had 
maintained a full-scale assault on the theory that the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment was to guarantee the right to have guns apart from militia service. See e.g., Saul 
Cornell, A Well Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origins of Gun Control 
in America (Oxford Univ. Press 2006); H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The 
Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent (Duke Univ. 
Press 2002); Carl T. Bogus (ed.), The Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians 
and Constitutional Scholars on the Right To Bear Arms (New Press 2000).
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after Heller, with twenty-four historians (and one political science professor) 
joining amicus briefs in McDonald v. City of Chicago sharply critical of the Heller 
majority’s treatment of original meaning.8 Indeed, in his McDonald dissent, 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor, noted “[s]ince 
Heller, historians, scholars, and judges have continued to express the view 
that the Court’s historical analysis was flawed.”9 Justice Breyer was moved 
to ask: “If history, and history alone, is what matters, why would the Court 
not now reconsider Heller in light of these more recently published historical 
views?”10 Those who support the Heller ruling on originalist grounds ought 
to experience some discomfort from the withering criticism of the majority 
opinion from those with expertise in the history of the period and the meaning 
of the text to those who lived that history.11
Professor Tushnet may regard the issue of original meaning as a close 
question in part because of the way he frames the question. For Tushnet, the 
issue is whether the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right” 
(and he describes various versions of that theory), or whether it creates a 
“collective right” or “states’ right,” i.e. “the right of the states to organize their 
own militias, roughly, the state-organized National Guard we now have” (48). 
The use of this terminology gives the “individual right” view an immediate 
advantage, because the text clearly grants the right to “the people,” which 
intuitively means individuals, not states. Moreover, it places a difficult burden 
8. Brief for English/Early American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
McDonald (No. 08–1521); Brief of Historians on Early American Legal, Constitutional and 
Pennsylvania History as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, McDonald (No. 08–1521). 
The scholarly literature also reflects the historians’ hostility to the Heller majority’s version 
of original meaning. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: 
“Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1095 (2009); David Thomas 
Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the 
Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1295 
(2009); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Originalism on Trial].
9. McDonald, No. 08–1521, at 3 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 5.
11. It could be argued that Tushnet’s judgment that the original meaning of the Second 
Amendment is a close question was vindicated by the Heller Court’s 5–4 vote, as well as by 
the sheer length of the majority’s discussion of original meaning. As I have developed in 
more detail elsewhere, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion is far more an exercise in ideology 
than in principled constitutional adjudication, even under the banner of originalism. See 
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1171 (2009). As to the length of 
Scalia’s opinion, I prefer the view of Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit and the most prolific conservative legal scholar of our time, who found 
the length of the opinion “evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to produce snow 
jobs.” Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, 
The New Republic, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32. For a provocative critique of Heller by another 
prominent conservative jurist, who denounced the opinion as “judicial lawmaking,” see J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 
253 (2009).
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on the advocate of a “collective right” interpretation to explain how a right 
granted to “the people” could be “collective,” but not be “individual” at all.
This Second Amendment issue need not, and should not, be framed in this 
way, although it often is, by courts and commentators.12 There is no doubt 
that the text confers the right on “the people.” The issue is the nature and 
scope of the right conferred on “the people.” Is it a right to be armed for 
personal, non-militia purposes? Or is it a right to be armed only in connection 
with service in the organized militia of the states? One of the most appealing 
aspects of Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent is that it, at the outset, cuts through 
the misleading terminology:
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment 
protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it protects a 
right that can be enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us anything about the 
scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sporting 
activities, and to perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly 
does not protect the right to use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that 
it does encompass the right to use weapons for certain military purposes. 
Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary 
purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by 
this case.13
With the issue posed in this way, the militia purpose view acquires new 
strength. Indeed, this reframing of the issue shifts the burden to proponents 
of the private purpose view to explain why the text begins with an assertion of 
the importance of a “well regulated Militia” if the people’s right to keep and 
bear arms is for purposes that may have nothing to do with militia service.
Apart from his framing of the issue, Tushnet’s assessment of text and original 
meaning as a close question suffers from his failure to do the more penetrating 
analysis needed to separate the strong arguments from the weak ones.
For example, Tushnet attaches unfortunate plausibility to the meaning of 
the phrase “well regulated Militia” advanced by the private purpose advocates. 
As he correctly describes it, their version of a “well regulated Militia” turns 
out to be not “regulated” at all. Citing 18th century sources referring to the 
militia as “composed of the body of the people,” Tushnet asserts* that the 
militia “consisted of every able-bodied mature white male…[and] not an 
organization with a list of qualifications for membership, or indeed any sort of 
‘organization’ at all” (10). If the “well regulated Militia” is simply a term for 
12. For a discussion of the frequently misleading framing of the Second Amendment issue, see 
Dennis A. Henigan, Self-Inflicted Wounds: The D.C. Circuit on the Second Amendment, 
18 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 209, 223 n.78, 225 n.84 (2008). See also David Yassky, The 
Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 588, 
613–615 (2000).
13. Heller, 128 S.Ct.at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the body of armed individuals who could be organized into a fighting force 
(but haven’t been), there seems little tension between the use of that phrase 
and the guarantee of a right to possess guns for the private purposes of those 
same individuals. “As a matter of original understanding,” Tushnet writes, 
“this interpretation seems unassailable” (10).
Actually, this interpretation of the “well regulated Militia” is quite assailable. 
There is no question that the militias of the founding era were composed of the 
vast majority of able-bodied males. However, the concept of an “unorganized 
militia” was foreign to that era.14 Indeed, it is fair to say that a militia came 
into being only through individuals being organized into a militia.15 As Justice 
Stevens’s Heller dissent painstakingly shows, the pre-constitutional militias were 
organized by operation of state law.16 In short, the “well regulated Militia” was 
a system of compulsory military service imposed on much of the adult male 
population. As Noah Webster described it in his legendary 1828 dictionary, 
“The militia of a country are the able bodied men organized into companies, 
regiments and brigades…and required by law to attend military exercises on 
certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations.”17 
Militiamen were ordinary citizens pursuing “their usual occupations,” thus 
distinguishing the militia from the professional soldiers of what was then 
called the “standing army.”18
After finding “unassailable” the idea that the “well regulated Militia” was 
simply the unorganized body of armed citizens, Tushnet struggles with the 
concept of the militia reflected in the body of the Constitution. The “militia 
clauses” of the Constitution, in Article I, Section 8, gave Congress new authority 
over the militia, which previously had been entirely state-organized. Congress 
14. It is true that the definition of “militia” in current federal law distinguishes between the 
“organized militia” and the “unorganized militia.” Under this provision, the “organized 
militia” is the National Guard and the “unorganized militia” is “all able-bodied males at 
least 17 years of age and…under 45 years of age…” who are not in the National Guard or the 
Naval Militia. 10 U.S.C. §311. However, this distinction between the “organized” and the 
“unorganized” militia was a creation of the Dick Act of 1903, which gave birth to the modern 
National Guard system. See generally Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second 
Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. Dayton 
Law Rev. 5, 34–39 (1989) (discussing history of the militia). It was a distinction unknown to 
the Framers.
15. Tushnet finds the analogy between militias and juries to be instructive in several respects (35, 
38). If we were to take the analogy seriously, however, it would seem to defeat any notion 
of the militia as being the unorganized body of the people. There is no legitimate use of 
the term “jury” that refers to the unorganized body of the people. The jury, like the militia, 
comes into being precisely by being organized according to the rules established by a system 
of law.
16. Heller, 128 S.Ct., at 2825 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Noah Webster, Noah Webster’s First Edition of an American Dictionary of the English 
Language (7th ed., Found. for American Christian Education 1993).
18. That the militia of the founding era consisted of most able-bodied males also distinguishes 
it from the National Guard, the closest modern analogue to the “well regulated Militia” of 
the 18th century, but hardly equivalent to it.
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was given power to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia,” as well as “calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasion.” The states retained the power 
to appoint militia officers and to train the militia “according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress.”19 Indeed, the animating concern leading to adoption 
of the Second Amendment was the fear of the Anti-Federalist opponents of 
the Constitution that the grant of power to Congress to organize and arm the 
militia amounted to an exclusive power to do so, thus giving Congress the 
power to destroy the state militias through federal hostility or neglect.20 The 
Second Amendment was written to allay these concerns by making the keeping 
and bearing of arms in a state militia a “right of the people,” not dependent 
on federal action.21 It ensured that the state militias would be armed, even if 
Congress abandoned them.
 In the final analysis, to read the “well regulated Militia” in the Second 
Amendment to mean the unorganized body of armed citizens is necessarily 
to find that the Framers adopted an entirely different understanding of the 
militia in the Second Amendment than that embodied in the militia clauses of 
the Constitution. This seems unlikely, to say the least.
Tushnet recognizes the problem, commenting that “[r]eading the Second 
Amendment against the background of the original Constitution’s references 
to the militia, we might conclude that the Second Amendment’s preamble 
refers to the state-organized militia” (14). What was, a few pages before, the 
“unassailable” originalist view of the “well regulated Militia” as “unorganized,” 
now becomes “something of a stretch” (14), once the Second Amendment’s 
reference to the militia is interpreted in light of the original meaning of the 
militia clauses, in which the militia is a body organized at the direction of 
governmental authority. Tushnet is able to toggle back and forth between 
positions like this because he views his task as simply commenting on the 
various arguments, not making a serious effort to cut through the competing 
claims to discern the best answer. It is not clear, however, how the meaning of 
the “well regulated Militia” in the Second Amendment is a close question at 
all.
Although Tushnet, at one point, observes that “a lot will turn on what we 
understand…a militia to be” (8), he treats the possible relationship between 
the militia reference and the remainder of the Amendment in a way that 
provides an avenue for entirely ignoring the militia language. As he poses 
19. U.S. Const., art I, §8, cl. 15–16.
20. As noted in Justice Stevens’s dissent, Anti-Federalist George Mason argued during the 
Virginia ratification debates that Congress’s new power would allow Congress to destroy 
the militia by “rendering them useless—by disarming them…. Congress may neglect to 
provide for arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, 
for Congress has an exclusive power to arm them.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2833 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 379 (2d ed., Jonathon Elliot ed., Hein 1863)).
21. See Uviller & Merkel, supra note 7.
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it, the question is whether the language about the “well regulated Militia” 
limits or places conditions on the scope of the right, or whether the militia 
reference merely explains why the right is placed in the Constitution (8). If 
the militia language “is simply an explanation and not a condition,” then, 
according to Tushnet, it may not matter whether the militia reference is to the 
same organized militia addressed in the separate militia clauses (15).
Tushnet presents the issue of “condition” vs. “explanation” as a close 
question only by ignoring what the Supreme Court has called “the first 
principle of constitutional interpretation.”22 This principle—dating back to 
Marbury v. Madison23—is that the Constitution must be interpreted such that 
“real effect should be given to all the words it uses,”24 and that interpretations 
rendering some of its words “mere surplusage” must be avoided.25 Treating the 
militia language in the Second Amendment as merely “explanatory” violates 
this rule because the meaning and scope of the people’s right to keep and bear 
arms would be the same were the militia “explanation” to have been deleted.
The only way to read the Second Amendment consistent with this “first 
principle” is to regard the militia language as providing the context essential 
to understanding the meaning of the right guaranteed. It is surely instructive 
that nowhere else in the Bill of Rights did the Framers append similar non-
functional, “explanatory” language. To adopt the private purpose view is to 
arbitrarily stipulate that the first thirteen words of the Second Amendment are 
the only words in the Bill of Rights that have no functional meaning. As Justice 
Stevens concludes: “When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment is 
most naturally read to secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in 
conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia.”26
A final problem with Tushnet’s treatment is that he often does not 
distinguish between the relative importance of various evidence of original 
meaning. Some evidence is simply more persuasive than other evidence. A 
good example is the version of the Second Amendment text offered by its 
author, James Madison, to the First Congress:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well 
armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but 
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in 
person.27
22. Wright v. United States, 302 US. 583, 588 (1938).
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
24. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151–52 (1926) (citing Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 544 
(1903)).
25. See Wright, 302 U.S. at 588.
26. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
27. The Complete Bill of Rights, The Drafts, Debates, Sources, & Origins 169 (Neil H. Cogan, 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (emphasis added).
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If the original meaning were to guarantee individuals the right to choose 
to have a gun (or not to have one), why would it have made any sense for 
Madison to include a conscientious objector clause? Tushnet himself observes 
that “[a] provision guaranteeing individuals the right to keep and bear arms 
wouldn’t have to contain an exemption for such objectors because they would 
simply choose not to own weapons” (49). The presence of the conscientious 
objector clause is powerful evidence that the author of the Second Amendment 
regarded it as solely about the possession and use of guns in an organized 
military force.
Moreover, the debates in the First Congress largely concerned the objection 
of some Anti-Federalists that the conscientious objector clause would be 
used to weaken the militia, an argument that presumably led to the clause’s 
deletion. Representative Elbridge Gerry, for example, argued that the clause 
would enable the government to “declare who are those religiously scrupulous, 
and prevent them from bearing arms.”28 Gerry continued, “What, sir, is the 
use of the militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the 
bane of liberty.”29 This debate over the conscientious objector clause makes 
no sense if the Amendment is understood simply to guarantee individuals 
the right to have a gun for personal purposes unrelated to militia duty. Thus, 
the legislative history of the clause establishes that the First Congress had 
the same understanding of the text as did the drafter Madison. As Justice 
Stevens summarized the matter in his Heller dissent, “The ultimate removal of 
the clause, therefore, only serves to confirm the purpose of the Amendment to 
protect against congressional disarmament, by whatever means, of the States’ 
militias.”30
Though Tushnet cites the history of the clause, he nevertheless observes 
that though there were “scattered expressions during the run-up to the Second 
Amendment’s adoption” consistent with the view that the Amendment 
concerned only state militias, “you have to work pretty hard to elevate them 
into a position of primary importance” (49–50). The reader is left to wonder 
why the intense focus of the First Congress on whether conscientious objectors 
should be exempt from militia service is not of primary, if not decisive, 
importance in determining original meaning.31
28. Helen Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, & Charlene Bangs Bickford, Creating the Bill of Rights: 
The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress 182 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
1991).
29. Id.
30. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2836 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. It should be recognized that there is substantial disagreement among legal scholars and 
judges about the relevance of legislative history to constitutional interpretation, though 
Professor Tushnet does not enter that particular fray. Justice Scalia, for example, has long 
been associated with the view that the intentions of the Framers are largely immaterial, 
since the interpretive task is to determine the meaning of the text to, as he put it in Heller, 
“ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788. The argument 
against considering legislative history often cites the difficulty of determining the intentions 
of the Framers with any certainty. In the case of the Second Amendment, however, that 
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Apart from the controversy over the meaning of the Second Amendment 
(which continues with vigor after Heller), there is the separate question of 
the significance of the private purpose view for gun control laws. Tushnet 
correctly points out that, for gun rights advocates, winning the battle over the 
meaning of the Second Amendment “doesn’t mean winning the war” because 
“[e]veryone agrees that legislatures have the power—sometimes—to regulate 
the exercise of individual rights” (118). The issue is: How much leeway will 
legislative bodies have to regulate guns after Heller?
Here Tushnet may well be prescient, when he comments that “substantial 
amounts of gun control are constitutionally permissible even if we accept 
the best versions of the arguments favored by gun-rights proponents” (xvi). 
There is, in fact, important language in Heller suggesting that a broad range 
of gun laws do not violate the newly discovered right. According to the Court 
“[T]he right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”32 The Court then goes 
out of its way to offer the assurance that “nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt” on several broad categories of gun control laws, which 
the Court said remain “presumptively lawful” under the Court’s ruling. These 
include “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale 
of arms” (a category broad enough to include background checks, waiting 
periods, licensing, registration, safety training, etc.), “prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons” (a more restrictive policy than simply requiring a license 
to carry concealed weapons), “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,” and bans on 
“dangerous and unusual weapons” (which could include machine guns and 
semi-automatic assault weapons).33 Significantly, the Court added that these 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” are given “only as examples” and 
that the list “does not purport to be exhaustive.”34
Although these comments are dicta, they have thus far proven to be 
extraordinarily influential in the lower courts in protecting federal gun laws 
from successful attack.35 Essentially, they have functioned to provide “safe 
objection is far weaker because the legislative history so strongly supports one of the 
competing interpretations of the text. It raises the question: Is it defensible to give the 
Second Amendment a meaning entirely different from that understood by James Madison, 
its primary drafter, and by the First Congress that debated and ratified it? In any event, 
there is little evidence in the Heller majority opinion suggesting that “ordinary citizens” of 
that era interpreted “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” as concerning private 
self-defense, and not militia service, in a text that begins with a reference to the importance 
of the “well regulated Militia” to the “security of a free State.” One prominent historian has 
commented that “Justice Scalia’s brand of plain-meaning originalism is little more than a 
smoke screen for his own political agenda.” Cornell, Originalism on Trial, supra note 8, at 
630.
32. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816.
33. Id. at 2816–17.
34. Id. at 2817 n.26.
35. See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA Law Rev. 1551, 1565–1568 (2009).
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harbors” for the categories of gun laws listed by the Court, as well as those 
that seem analogous to the listed categories. Although there is still substantial 
uncertainty about the impact of Heller, based on the decision alone, there 
is little reason to believe that gun restrictions short of the kind of handgun 
ban struck down in that case will be in serious jeopardy. As professor Adam 
Winkler of UCLA Law School has said, “the Heller case is a landmark decision 
that has not changed very much at all.”36
In McDonald, Justice Alito’s lead opinion restated the Heller assurances 
about the continued presumptive constitutionality of gun regulations, and 
added, “We repeat those assurances here.”37 This strong endorsement of the 
Heller dicta suggests that it may well furnish “safe harbors” for a wide variety 
of strict state and local gun regulations that no doubt will be challenged in the 
wake of McDonald.
Before Heller and McDonald, gun control was a policy issue, not a constitutional 
issue. It may largely remain that way after those decisions.
The Gun Policy Debate
In contrast to the Second Amendment issue, where Tushnet’s conclusions 
are fairly described as weak, his conclusions on gun policy are quite strong. In 
his view, the only gun control policy that “might have an impact on gun-related 
violence, at least eventually,” would be “a nationwide ban on the private 
ownership of guns coupled with a policy of confiscating all guns already in 
private possession” (77). As he accurately observes, “as a political matter there 
is no chance whatever that such a ban will be enacted” (77). After Heller and 
McDonald, of course, such a policy obviously would be unconstitutional as well. 
As to less restrictive policies, he concludes: “Here the evidence seems pretty 
clear that any gun-related policy likely to survive a political process deeply 
affected by the culture wars will not do much to reduce violence”38 (xvii).
Tushnet offers no serious support for this sweeping dismissal of all gun 
control policies short of total confiscation. For example, he focuses on so-called 
“safe storage” laws enacted in many states that impose criminal penalties on 
gun owners when a shooting occurs because a loaded, unlocked gun is stored 
accessible to children. He dismisses the effectiveness of such laws by citing a case 
where a teenager unintentionally discharged a rifle at a raucous party, shooting 
another teen in the head and killing him (73–74). Because the shooter’s parent 
36. Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 
2009 (quoting Winkler) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/us/17bar.html (last 
visited August 13, 2010).
37. McDonald No. 08–1521, at 39–40.
38. For Tushnet, this conclusion also applies to policies seeking to curb violence through the 
proliferation of firearms (xvii). Indeed, he devotes much space to an entertaining discussion 
of the statistical maze surrounding the controversial claim by John Lott that state laws 
making it easier to carry concealed weapons resulted in dramatic reductions in crime (79–
98). My own discussion of Lott’s work may be found at Dennis A. Henigan, Lethal Logic: 
Exploding the Myths that Paralyze American Gun Policy 131–38 (Potomac Books 2009). 
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had been so irresponsible as to require the party’s guests to supply money, 
alcohol, or drugs as the price of admission, Tushnet persuasively suggests 
that a law requiring safe storage of firearms likely would not have induced the 
parent to lock the household gun away (100). Of course, this proves only that 
safe storage laws will not cause every gun owner to be responsible. It hardly 
demonstrates that such laws are doomed to failure. Tushnet does not mention 
the studies indicating that such laws have reduced adolescent suicide rates,39 
as well as accidental shootings by children and teens.40
In his discussion of gun policy, Tushnet’s greatest sin is one of omission. 
There is a vast scholarly literature supporting the effectiveness of gun control 
laws that Tushnet simply ignores.41 Even setting aside the issues of suicide and 
unintentional shootings, and focusing on gun crime, the research literature 
supports several broad propositions suggesting that regulation of the legal 
market in guns can reduce access to guns by dangerous people, with the effect 
of lowering the incidence of homicides and gun injuries.
First, the experience of other western, industrialized nations strongly 
suggests that gun restrictions can reduce homicide rates by making guns 
less accessible to violent people. Here the pioneering work has been done 
by Professor Franklin Zimring of the University of California, Berkeley Law 
School, along with collaborator Gordon Hawkins. Zimring and Hawkins 
compared U.S. crime with that of other industrialized nations and found 
that the U.S. does not have significantly higher rates of crime, even violent 
crime. Rates for assault in the United States are actually lower than in Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia and are nearly identical to those in Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Poland.42 What distinguishes the U.S. from these other 
countries is that U.S. crime is far more lethal. The rate of assaults leading 
to death is several times higher in the U.S. than in Canada, New Zealand, 
and Australia. Homicide rates in Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland are 
39. Daniel W. Webster, Jon S. Vernick, April M. Zeoli & Jennifer A. Manganello, Association 
Between Youth-Focused Firearm Law and Youth Suicides, 292 JAMA 594 (2004).
40. Daniel Webster & Marc Starnes, Reexamining the Association Between Child Access 
Prevention Laws and Unintentional Shooting Deaths of Children, 106 Pediatrics 1466 
(2000).
41. This literature is ably presented by Dr. David Hemenway, Director of the Harvard University 
Injury Control Research Center, in his landmark work, Private Guns, Public Health. 
Hemenway finds that “there are scores of reasonable policies that could reduce U.S. firearm 
injuries while keeping almost all of the recreational and self-defense benefits of firearms.” 
David Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health 213 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2004). 
42. Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in 
America 38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
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a fraction of the American homicide rate.43 Moreover, only in the U.S. do 
firearms play a major role in violent crime. The U.S. is the only large industrial 
democracy that reports firearms as involved in a majority of its homicides.44
These other nations have gun control laws that are far stronger than in 
the U.S., although not nearly as strong as the “total confiscation” policy 
Tushnet believes to be the only alternative with any chance of success. The 
international crime data indicate that other countries have violent people 
who commit violent crimes, but their strong gun laws reduce their use of guns 
in crime, thus making crime far less lethal. Others may disagree with this 
interpretation of the data, but Tushnet can fairly be criticized for reaching his 
policy conclusions without accounting for them at all.
Second, the consistent pattern of interstate movement of guns used in crimes 
also argues against Tushnet’s argument for gun law futility, yet is ignored in his 
text. Generally speaking, in states with strong gun laws, guns used in crime are 
acquired from gun dealers in other states with weaker gun laws. Conversely, 
in states with weak gun laws, crime guns originate with dealers within that 
state. One Johns Hopkins study of crime guns in twenty-five American cities 
showed that in five cities in states with both licensing and registration laws, 
a mean of 33.7 percent of crime guns were first sold by in-state gun dealers, 
whereas in thirteen cities in states with neither licensing nor registration, 84.2 
percent of crime guns originated with in-state dealers.45
What does this pattern tell us? There is no obvious reason for criminals to 
prefer out-of-state sources for their guns. The interstate movement of crime 
guns suggests that strong state regulation of the legal market in guns forces 
criminals to access guns in other states. It also supports the idea that strong 
federal regulation of the legal market could reduce criminal access to guns 
more effectively than state regulation by reducing the capacity of criminals to 
exploit weak state gun laws.
Third, the nation’s experience with the Brady Act, which mandates a 
background check on persons buying guns from licensed dealers, also suggests 
that even fairly modest gun restrictions can reduce the use of guns in crime. I 
have summarized the key data elsewhere:
Although, as the NRA often points out, violent crime rates began declining 
shortly before the Brady Act went into effect in 1994, the use of firearms in 
violent crime did not begin its sharp decline until that year. In the five years 
preceding Brady, the percentage of violent crimes committed with firearms 
increased every year. Beginning in 1994, a stunning reversal occurred. The 
proportion of nonlethal violent crimes committed with firearms declined 
by 45 percent from its high point in 1993 to 2004. Even more remarkable is 
43. Id. at 39.
44. Id. at 109.
45. Daniel W. Webster, Jon S. Vernick & Maria T. Bulzacchelli, Relationship Between Licensing, 
Registration, and Other Gun Sales Laws and the Source States of Crime Guns, 7 Injury 
Prevention 184 (2001).
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the decline in the absolute number of nonlethal violent gun crimes, from 
1,054,820 in 1993 to 280,890 in 2004, a drop of 73 percent. During the same 
period, gun homicides dropped 37 percent, driving a 34 percent decline in 
all homicides. During those same years, an estimated 1,228,000 criminals and 
other prohibited purchasers were blocked by Brady background checks from 
buying guns from licensed gun dealers.46
Of course, there likely were a number of factors contributing to the sharp 
reduction in crime during that ten-year period. But the data certainly support 
an inference that the Brady Act played a role in reducing the use of guns in 
crime, with a resulting reduction in homicides.47 The Brady Act record also 
supports extending Brady background checks to private sales at gun shows 
and elsewhere, as reflected in legislation currently pending in Congress. 
Without at least addressing the decline in gun crime following the Brady Act, 
Tushnet is far too quick to dismiss the possible impact of regulatory proposals 
that fall short of a broad gun ban.
Obviously Professor Tushnet did not set out to write the definitive treatise 
on gun control policy. Out of Range, including notes, is only 150 pages long. 
It is certainly Tushnet’s prerogative to take an abbreviated stroll through the 
policy issues. Such an approach, however, should avoid the kind of strong 
conclusions that only a more comprehensive treatment could adequately 
support.
The Future of the Gun Debate
Tushnet’s view that no politically feasible gun laws will ever do much to 
reduce gun violence leads him to advocate avoiding the culture wars entirely 
by redirecting the debate over violence away from the gun issue altogether:
So maybe we should simply turn our attention to other policies that might 
be more effective in fighting crime and violence: more police on the streets, 
ensuring that young people have better access to education and jobs, more 
disparagement by leading public figures of violence on television and in 
movies, or whatever else serious inquiry into the causes of crime and violence 
reveals to be somewhat effective policies. This is not a book about such 
policies, and I don’t know whether there are any decent effective ones. But, 
it seems, gun policies aren’t all that effective, and fighting over them might 
simply be a diversion from efforts that might be more effective (131).
46. Henigan, supra note 38, at 44.
47. But see Philip Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of the Brady Act on Gun Violence, in Guns, 
Crime and Punishment in America 283 (Bernard E. Harcourt, ed., NYU Press 2003) (finding 
no evidence that the Brady Law reduced lethal violence). The limitations of the Cook and 
Ludwig findings are discussed in Henigan, supra note 38, at 56–57. See also James M. LaValle, 
Rebuilding at Gunpoint: A City-Level Re-Estimation of the Brady Law and RTC Laws in 
the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 18 Crim. Justice Pol. Rev. 451, 463 (2007) (finding, contrary 
to Cook and Ludwig, a statistically significant negative effect of the Brady Law on homicide 
rates and gun-homicide rates).
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Obviously, there are many strategies for fighting crime and violence not 
involving gun control that should be explored and implemented (though 
Tushnet is willing to jettison gun control entirely while making no attempt to 
show the effectiveness of alternatives). Given the substantial evidence of the 
lifesaving benefits of gun regulation, however, it would be a tragic mistake to 
simply abandon that effort as a way of disarming the culture war. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of these other measures would certainly be compromised by a 
policy that, for example, continues to allow criminals to buy guns from gun 
shows with no questions asked. Does it make sense to put more police on the 
streets and yet allow criminals easy access to the weaponry that threatens the 
lives of those same police officers?
Whereas Tushnet is convinced that the gun issue inevitably provokes 
a divisive culture war that paralyzes effective action, I suggest a different 
perspective. There is no question that it is possible to frame the gun issue as 
primarily a cultural issue. Indeed, framing it in this way is highly beneficial 
to the gun lobby. If gun control is seen as an attack on the value systems of 
millions of gun-owning Americans, this allows the NRA to radicalize and 
mobilize gun owners to oppose even modest changes in our nation’s gun laws. 
However, framing the issue as primarily cultural is not inevitable. As 
Tushnet himself notes, quoting political scientist Morris Fiorina, “A solid 
majority of blue state voters support stricter gun-control laws, but so does a 
narrow majority of red state voters” (132). Recent polling data makes the point 
even more dramatically. A poll taken by Republican messaging guru Frank 
Luntz found that 86 percent of gun owners who do not belong to the NRA, 
and 69 percent of self-described NRA members, support closing the “gun 
show loophole” by extending Brady Act background checks to private sales 
at gun shows.48 An op-ed by Luntz and Milwaukee’s Democratic Mayor Tom 
Barrett reported that “the poll also found support among NRA members and 
other gun owners for numerous other policies to strengthen safety, security 
and law enforcement,” including blocking gun sales to persons on the terrorist 
watch list, requiring gun owners to report lost and stolen guns, and providing 
more crime gun data to local police.49 Indeed, there is a long history of polling 
showing that gun owners, by substantial majorities, support such policies 
as licensing and registration.50 When significant proportions of supposedly 
opposing cultural groups support the same policies, then, as Luntz and 
Barrett suggest, “the culture war over the right to bear arms isn’t much of a 
war after all.”51
48. Frank Luntz & Tom Barrett, New Poll at Odds with Gun Rhetoric, Milwaukee Journal-
Sentinel, Jan. 23, 2010, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/82436102.html 
(last visited August 13, 2010).
49. Id.
50. See Henigan supra note 38, at 2.
51. Luntz & Barrett, supra note 48.
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Recent history shows that it is possible to overcome the gun lobby’s cultural 
framing and redirect the national conversation to the merits of specific gun 
control proposals. Indeed, President Clinton was a master at making the issue 
about public safety, not culture. He marshaled the support of law enforcement 
officials, who speak with ultimate credibility about the real world danger of 
easy criminal access to guns, but could hardly be accused of being “anti-gun.” 
His skillful handling of the issue resulted in passage of the Brady Bill and the 
assault weapon ban (which, unfortunately, expired in 2004). 
Ironically, the Heller decision, over the long run, may help to reduce 
the power of the gun lobby’s cultural frame by reducing the impact of the 
“slippery slope” argument. Some years ago, the NRA’s Wayne LaPierre 
described “the plan” which is “so obvious to all who would see: First Step, 
enact a nationwide firearms waiting period law. Second Step, when the waiting 
period doesn’t reduce crime, and it won’t, enact a nationwide registration law. 
Final Step, confiscate all the registered firearms.”52 This kind of slippery slope 
argumentation is how the NRA uses the fear of ultimate gun confiscation to 
rally gun owners against gun regulations they actually support on the merits. 
What happens to the slippery slope argument after Heller? By creating a 
new personal right to a gun in the home for self-defense, the Heller Court, 
in Justice Scalia’s words, took broad gun bans “off the table” as a policy 
alternative.53 If broad gun bans are “off the table,” there is reason to believe 
that, over the long term, it will be more and more difficult for the NRA to 
sell gun owners on the idea that any strengthening of our gun laws is but a 
step toward gun confiscation. I am not suggesting that the NRA will abandon 
that argument, or that the group will no longer be successful in motivating a 
segment of American gun owners to oppose sensible controls. However, it may 
be that, over time, those arguments will prove less and less effective, and the 
cultural framing of the issue will begin to dissolve. By the same token, Heller 
may enhance the efforts of gun control advocates to frame the debate in terms 
of public safety, not cultural norms, as well as making it harder for politicians 
to hide behind the slippery slope argument to justify their opposition to laws 
that make sense when considered on their merits.54 A national debate on policy 
initiatives like mandating Brady background checks on private sales at gun 
shows, free from the fear that it may lead to gun confiscation, is far more fertile 
terrain for advocates of gun control.
52.  Wayne LaPierre, Guns, Crime and Freedom 48 (Regnery Publishing Inc. 1994).
53.  Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822.
54. For a fuller discussion of Heller as a paradox, in which the Supreme Court gave the gun 
lobby the meaning of the Second Amendment it had long sought, in a decision that may 
well weaken the gun lobby’s capacity to block sensible gun laws over the long run, see 
Henigan, supra note 11.
Book Review: Out of Range
338	 Journal of Legal Education
Contrary to the picture Tushnet paints of the gun issue as an endless, 
pointless cultural battle, it is far closer to reality to see it as the strategic use 
of cultural appeals by a highly motivated and well-organized minority to 
frustrate the will of the majority to enact gun restrictions that reduce access to 
guns by dangerous people but allow the law-abiding to own them. We do need 
a new, national conversation about guns, but not one that surrenders to the 
cultural warriors all hope of bringing sanity to our nation’s gun policy. And 
yes, Professor Tushnet, there is a great deal at stake: the safety of our children, 
our families and our communities.
*Editors’ Note: The printed version of this book review inadvertently omitted the words, “Tushnet asserts,” 
in the quotation at the bottom of page 326 referring to Tushnet’s definition of a militia. We have corrected 
the error in this pdf and sincerely regret the omission.
